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Abstract
Recently, due to the staggering growth of wireless data traffic, heterogeneous networks have drawn
tremendous attention due to the capabilities of enhancing the capacity/coverage and to save energy con-
sumption for the next generation wireless networks. In this paper, we study a long-run user-centric network
selection problem in the 5G heterogeneous network, where the network selection strategies of the users
can be investigated dynamically. Unlike the conventional studies on the long-run model, we incorporate the
memory effect and consider the fact that the decision-making of the users is affected by their memory, i.e.,
their past service experience. Namely, the users select the network based on not only their instantaneous
achievable service experience but also their past service experience within their memory. Specifically, we
model and study the interaction among the users in the framework of fractional evolutionary game based
on the classical evolutionary game theory and the concept of the power-law memory. We analytically
prove that the equilibrium of the fractional evolutionary game exists, is unique and uniformly stable. We
also numerically demonstrate the stability of the fractional evolutionary equilibrium. Extensive numerical
results have been conducted to evaluate the performance of the fractional evolutionary game. The numerical
results have revealed some insightful findings. For example, the user in the fractional evolutionary game
with positive memory effect can achieve a higher cumulative utility compared with the user in the fractional
evolutionary game with negative memory effect. Moreover, the fractional evolutionary game with positive
memory effect can reduce the loss in the user’s cumulative utility caused by the small-scale fading.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the proliferation of wireless handsets and portable devices as well as data-hungry mul-
timedia applications, mobile data demand continues to grow exponentially in recent years and is
likely to soon outgrow the capacity of the current cellular networks [1]. To address this severe issue,
the network will continue to become increasingly heterogeneous as we move to fifth generation
(5G) [2]. A heterogeneous network (HetNet) is a wireless network consisting of nodes with different
transmission powers and coverage sizes [3]. High power nodes (HPNs) with large coverage areas
are deployed in a planned way for blanket coverage of urban, suburban, or rural areas. Low power
nodes (LPNs) with small coverage areas aim to complement the HPNs for coverage extension
and throughput enhancement. By taking advantage of the best of different networking technologies,
multi-faceted benefits can be reaped in 5G heterogeneous networks, such as improving the utilization
of the network resources, enhancing the scalability and provisioning networking service upon
requirement [4].
A. Motivation
In this paper, we study a user-centric network selection problem in 5G HetNets, where the
users can freely select the network and access the networking service of which. Moreover, we
study the network selection problem on a long-run basis such that the behaviors of the users
can be investigated dynamically. It is worth noting here that to study such a long-run network
selection problem, it is natural and practical to consider that the users’ memory, i.e., past service
experience, will affect their decision-making. In other words, the users make their decisions by
taking into account not only their instantaneous achievable service experience but also their past
service experience. In brief, the action that the user selects the network can be regarded as the
behavior of an economic agent in an economic process. In the economic process, the economic
agent is aware of and pays great attention to the history of this process, hence the impact of which
on the behavior cannot be ignored. For example, one recent study reported that the visitors are
probably not deciding whether to enrol in the visited school during their visit, cloudiness must
be influencing college decisions through memory [5]. The reason is that, in reality, the students’
impression, i.e., their past experience in memory, about the college affects their decisions on the
college enrollment.
3B. Our Contributions
Nevertheless, the conventional dynamical model, i.e., classical evolutionary game, cannot capture
the impact of the users’ memory on their decision-making due to the fact that the players in the
classical evolutionary game only consider the instantaneous achievable utility 1. In this case, we
incorporate the concept of the power-law memory [7], which is used to depict the impact of the
users’ memory on their strategies [8]. That is, whenever the users are making decisions on their
current strategies, they will take into consideration not only their instantaneous achievable utility
but also their previous decisions within the memory [9]. It is worth noting that extensive works
that incorporate the memory effect have been proposed in the economics such as [10], [11] and the
modern physics such as [12], [13]. In particular, a generalization of the economic model of natural
growth, which takes into account the power-law memory effect, is suggested by the authors in [10].
Regarding the applications in the modern physics, the memory effect has been incorporated in [12]
to study the materials with memory.
In this paper, we study a dynamic network selection problem in 5G HetNets as shown in Fig. 1,
where a HetNet constituted of ultra-high frequency (UHF), i.e., the frequencies below 6 GHz, base
station (BS), millimeter-wave (mmWave) BS, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-enabled mmWave
BS is considered to be the application scenario for the 5G HetNet. In the problem, there two parties,
i.e., different types of BSs working as the utility providers with a flat-rate pricing scheme for
provisioning the communication service and the communication service customers, i.e., memory-
affecting rational users. Specifically, we first formulate a classical evolutionary game to analyze the
interaction among the users in the 5G HetNet on a long-run basis. Then, by incorporating the concept
of the power-law memory, which is depicted by using the fractional calculus (including fractional
derivatives and integrals), we cast the classical evolutionary game as a fractional evolutionary game,
where the dynamic behaviors of the memory-affecting rational users can be investigated.
The major contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We model the interactions among the network users in a framework of the classical evolutionary
game. Different from the traditional static game models in the existing literature, the proposed
framework in this paper is characterized by modeling the dynamic, i.e., time-variant, behaviors
of the users on a long-term basis.
• For the proposed classical evolutionary game model, we further incorporate the concept of
power-law memory to reformulate it into a fractional evolutionary game. The network selection
1In economics, the agents are memory-aware due to the well-known fact that the agents can remember the history of the economic
processes [6].
4strategies of the users from the classical evolutionary game and that from the fractional
evolutionary game are compared to investigate the impact of the users’ memory on their
strategies.
• We theoretically prove that the equilibrium in the fractional evolutionary game exists, and is
unique and uniformly stable. Moreover, we numerically verify the stability of the equilibrium
by using the direction field of the replicator dynamics.
• Extensive simulations have been conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed frac-
tional evolutionary game. The numerical results have revealed some interesting findings. For
example the users in the fractional evolutionary game with positive memory effect can achieve
higher utility compared with that in the classical evolutionary game and the fractional evolu-
tionary game with negative memory effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the related work and highlights
the research gap in the literature. Section III introduces the network model and the concept of the
power-law memory. Section IV describes the system model and the classical evolutionary game
formulation as well as the fractional evolutionary game formulation. Section V provides the proofs
of the existence and uniqueness as well as the stability of the equilibrium. Section VI presents the
numerical performance evaluation with some insightful results. Finally, Section VII concludes the
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Heterogeneous Networks
Nowadays, due to the capability of improving the spectral efficiency, the HetNets are inevitably
becoming an alternative solution in helping to meet the exponentially increased wireless data
traffic [14]. The HetNet, which is an overlay of multiple cellular networks such as macrocells,
microcells, and femtocells, has been verified to have greater end-user data rate and throughput
as well as better indoor and cell-edge coverage [15]. For these reasons, a number of works are
presented to improve the performance of the HetNets. In [16], the authors developed a general
analytical model for a hybrid cellular network constituted of the traditional sub-6 GHz macrocells
and mmWave small cells and analyzed how the user should associate with these two types of BSs
in the uplink and downlink. To reduce the number of handoffs while maintaining user’s Quality of
Service (QoS) requirements in mmWave HetNets, a reinforcement learning based handoff policy
named SMART was introduced in [17]. The authors in [18] proposed a joint resource allocation
and network access problem to investigate the coexistence mechanism for license-assisted access
5LTE (LAA-LTE) based HetNets. In this joint resource allocation and network access problem, the
normalized throughput of the unlicensed band was maximized while meeting the QoS requirement
of incumbent WiFi user. Considering the multimedia application QoS in the heterogeneous wireless
networks, an optimal distributed network selection scheme was presented in [19], which is applicable
to both tight coupling and loose coupling scenarios in the integration of heterogeneous wireless
network. The author in [20] studied a joint user association and rate allocation problem for HTTP
adaptive streaming in HetNets, where the system utility was maximized, and moreover, the user’s
requirement of Quality of Experience (QoE) was satisfied. By deploying distributed caching helpers
in heterogeneous architectures, the capacity bottleneck of backhaul networks can be alleviated while
the area spectral efficiency can be improved [21].
B. The Network Selection in Wireless Networks
Recently, due to the diversity of the communication technologies and also the heterogeneity of the
cellular networks, there are some works concerning the network selection in the wireless networks.
For example, the authors in [22] presented a tutorial of mathematical modeling for network selection
in HetNets. In [23], a renewal theoretical framework was proposed to study the dynamic spectrum
access in cognitive radio networks. Therein, the authors considered a challenging scenario that the
secondary user does not know about the primary user’s communication mechanism, which would
induce additional interference in the primary user’s communication. A stochastic game was proposed
in [24] to investigate the network selection in the wireless access networks. In this stochastic game,
the influence of subsequent users’ network selection decision on an individual’s throughput due
to the limited available resources is captured by using the negative network effect. The authors
in [25] designed spectrum access mechanisms with the scenarios of both complete and incomplete
network information, where an evolutionary spectrum access mechanism and a distributed learning
mechanism were introduced to handle the scenarios with complete and incomplete network infor-
mation, respectively. A new MAC algorithm was proposed in [26] to achieve the network utility
maximization while taking the form of random access without message passing. Hop selection
problem in ultra-dense cellular networks was discussed by the authors in [27].
C. Memory effect
As one of the important rational components, memory formalism in finance represents the effect
of memory on the economic operators for their action in the markets [28]. Specifically, the economic
process with dynamic memory assumes the awareness of the economic agents about the history
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Figure 1: 5G Heterogeneous Network Architecture
of this process. In such a process, the behavior of the economic agent is based on not only the
instantaneous information of the state of the process at a given moment but also the information
about the process states at previous moments over a time interval [7]. This is well consistent with
the reality, which results in that the economic processes with dynamic memory are actively studied
in recent years. In [29], generalizations of price elasticity of demand to the case of processes with
dynamic memory have been defined, where the changes of the price in the previous time horizon are
taken into account. The authors in [30] discussed a generalization of the economic growth model
with a constant pace under the effect of dynamic memory. In this model, the economic agents
are considered to have the memory of their previous decisions and states, which will consequently
induce different reactions for the agents.
However, to our best knowledge, it still remains an open research question that what will happen
if the decision-making of the users is affected by their memory during the network selection
processes in the HetNets. The aforementioned works inspire us to incorporate the users’ memory
and investigate their interaction through a fractional evolutionary game theory framework. This is
the main objective as well as the major contribution of our studies.
III. PRELIMINARY
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a 5G HetNet constituted of three types of BSs, i.e., UHF BS,
mmWave BS, and UAV-enabled mmWave BS as the application scenario. Here, the propagation
models of the aforementioned types of BSs are presented in Section III-A. For simplicity, we
assume that ideal backhaul links exist between the UAV-enabled mmWave BSs and their nearby
7Table I: Notations for the Network Model
Symbol Definition
Wm, Wu Wa Bandwidth of an mmWave channel, a UHF channel, and an UAV-enabled mmWave channel, respectively.
P tu, P tm, P ta The transmit power of a UHF BS, an mmWave BS, and an UAV-enabled mmWave BS, respectively.
σ2m, σ2u, σ2a The noise power in the mmWave channel, UHF channel, and UAV-enabled mmWave channel, respectively.
αu, αLOSm , αNLOSm Path-loss exponent of UHF signals, LOS and NLOS path-loss exponent of mmWave signals.
fm, fu mmWave and UHF carrier frequencies.
Gu, Gm,i, Ga,i The gains of UHF BS antenna, mmWave BS antenna, and UAV-enabled mmWave BS antenna, respectively.
GM , GS , GA
mmWave BS’s main lobe gain, mmWave BS’s side lobe gain, and UAV-enabled mmWave BS’s main lobe
gain, respectively.
C, D Fractional LOS area C in a disc of radius D.
hu,i, hm,i, ha,i
small-scale fading of UHF BS antenna, mmWave BS antenna, and UAV-enabled mmWave BS
antenna, respectively.
Nu, Nm, Na Number of users served by a UHF BS, an mmWave BS, and an UAV-enabled mmWave BS, respectively.
Ha The altitude of UAV-enabled mmWave BS a.
θSm, θSa
The main beamwidth of mmWave BS m and the half-power beamwidth of UAV-enabled mmWave
BS a, respectively.
CUi , CMi , CAi The sets of UHF BSs, mmWave BSs and UAV-enabled mmWave BSs cover user i, respectively.
mmWave BSs. As the mmWave BSs’ transmit power is much larger than that of the UAV-enabled
mmWave BSs, it is reasonable to consider that the transmission rate of the backhaul links of
the UAV-enabled mmWave BSs is much faster than that of the downlinks of the UAV-enabled
mmWave BSs. Therefore, the throughput of the backhauls of the UAV-enabled mmWave BSs will
not affect the throughput of their downlinks. In addition, as most of the energy of the UAV-enabled
mmWave BS will be consumed by its flight [31], we assume that the scheduling of the UAV-enabled
mmWave communication service can ensure that the UAV-enabled mmWave BS will be replaced by
a fully charged UAV-enabled mmWave BS before its battery is going to be depleted by the flight.
Therefore, the limited energy of the UAV-enabled mmWave BS will not affect the UAV-enabled
mmWave communication service provision. Note here that the service customer, i.e., the user, is
considered to have an omnidirectional antenna.
Additionally, to incorporate the concept of power-law memory, we introduce the left-sided Caputo
fractional derivative with respect to time [9] in Section III-B. The power-law memory can be
captured by the left-sided Caputo fractional derivative, which has been widely adopted in the
literature such as [9], [10], [29].
A. Network Model
81) UHF Propagation Model: A set of UHF BSs, denoted by U , is deployed to provide UHF
communication service. The received downlink signal power at user i ∈ N from UHF BS u ∈ U
is
Pu,i = P
t
uhu,iρuGu [Lu (lu − li)]−1 , (1)
where lu, li ∈ R3×1 respectively denote the locations of UHF BS u and user i2, Lu (z) = ‖z‖αu
is the path-loss function, hu,i is the small-scale fading, Gu is the antenna gain, ρu is the near-field
path loss at 1 m, i.e., ρu =
(
c
4pifu
)2
, c represents the speed of light, and P tu is the transmit power.
Let Iu denote the set of the UHF BSs using the same channel as that of UHF BS u, the co-channel
interference of UHF BS u is
∑
w∈Iu
P twhw,iρwGw [Lw (lw − li)]−1, and the SINR for user i at UHF
BS u is P
t
uhu,iρuGu[Lu(lu−li)]−1∑
w∈Iu
P twhw,iρwGw[Lw(lw−li)]−1+σ2u
. As a result, the downlink transmission rate of user i at UHF
BS u is given as
Ru,i =
Wu
Nu
log2
1 + Pu,i∑
w∈Iu
Pw,i + σ2u

=
Wu
Nu
log2
1 + P tuhu,iρuGu [Lu (lu − li)]−1∑
w∈Iu
P twhw,iρwGw [Lw (lw − li)]−1 + σ2u
 ,
(2)
where Wu is the bandwidth of UHF channel at UHF BS u and Nu is the number of users selecting
UHF BS u. Here, we consider that UHF BSs use TDMA, and hence the number of users selecting
UHF BS w ∈ Iu will not affect the co-channel interference received by the users in the coverage
of UHF BS u. Note here that Ru,i represents the per-user transmission rate averaged over frame
time.
2) mmWave Propagation Model: The set of mmWave BSs, denoted by M, provide mmWave
communication service. The received signal power at user i in the downlink from an mmWave BS
m ∈M is
Pm,i = p
LOS
m,i P
t
mhm,iρmGm,i [Lm (lm − li)]−1 , (3)
where lm ∈ R3×1 is the location of mmWave BS m3, Lm (z) = ‖z‖α
s
m is the path-loss function for
an mmWave channel, therein s ∈ {LOS,NLOS} is the link indicator, hm,i is the small-scale fading,
Gm,i is the antenna gain, ρm is the near-field path loss at 1m, i.e., ρm =
(
c
4pifm
)2
, and P tm is the
2The third components of the three-dimensional vectors lu and li indicate the altitudes of UHF BS u and user i, respectively.
3The third component of lm indicates the altitude of mmWave BS m.
9transmit power. pLOSm,i is the line-of-sight probability as a function of the distance between user i
and mmWave BS m, i.e., rm,i = ‖lm − li‖, given by [32]
pLOSm,i =
C, if rm,i ≤ D,0, otherwise, (4)
where C ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as the average LOS area in the spherical region around a
typical user, e.g., [C,D] = [0.081, 250] for Chicago and [C,D] = [0.117, 200] for Manhattan [33].
The mmWave BSs are equipped with directional antennas and the antenna gain of mmWave BS m
for user i, i.e., Gm,i, is given by
Gm,i (θm,i) =
G
M, if |θm,i| ≤ θ
S
m
2
,
GS, otherwise,
(5)
where θm,i is the user i’s angle with respect to the best beam alignment, and θSm represents the main
beamwidth of mmWave BS m. With the directional antennas, the SNR for user i at mmWave BS
m is
pLOSm,i P
t
mhm,iρmGm,i[Lm(lm−li)]−1
σ2m
, where σ2m is the noise power in the mmWave BS m’s channel.
Correspondingly, the downlink transmission rate of user i at mmWave BS m is
Rm,i =
Wm
Nm
log2
(
1 +
Pm,i
σ2m
)
=
Wm
Nm
log2
(
1 +
pLOSm,i P
t
mhm,iρmGm,i [Lm (lm − li)]−1
σ2m
)
,
(6)
where Wm is the bandwidth of an mmWave channel at mmWave BS m and Nm is the number of
users selecting mmWave BS m.
3) UAV-enabled mmWave Propagation Model: The set of UAV-enabled mmWave BSs, denoted
by A, is deployed to provide UAV-enabled mmWave communication service. The received signal
power at user i in the downlink from an UAV-enabled mmWave BS a ∈ A is
Pa,i = p
LOS
a,i P
t
aha,iρaGa,i [La (la − li)]−1 , (7)
where the definitions of P ta , ha,i, ρa, and La (z) are similar to that in (3). Here, la ∈ R3×1 is
the location of UAV-enabled mmWave BS a, and the altitude of UAV-enabled mmWave BS a is
denoted by Ha, which is the third component of la. Similar to [34], each UAV-enabled mmWave BS
a ∈ A is equipped with a directional antenna pointing downward at the ground, whose half-power
beamwidths are θSa radians with
θSa
2
∈ (0, pi
2
)
. Then, the corresponding antenna gain for user i at
UAV-enabled mmWave BS a is [35]
Ga,i (la, li) =
G
A, if
∥∥ la|Ha=0 − li∥∥ ≤ Ha tan θSa2 ,
0, otherwise.
(8)
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pLOSa,i is the line-of-sight probability as a function of the distance between the user i and UAV-
enabled mmWave BS a on the 2-D plane, i.e., ra,i =
∥∥ la|Ha=0 − li∥∥, as well as the altitude of
UAV-enabled mmWave BS a, i.e., Ha, given by pLOSa,i (ra,i, Ha) =
1
1+b exp
(
−c
(
180
pi
tan−1
(
Ha
ra,i
)
−b
)) ,
where b and c are the constants depending on the environment, and la|Ha=0 is the projection of
UAV-enabled mmWave BS a on the ground [36] 4. Due to the directional antenna equipped by the
UAV-enabled mmWave BSs, the corresponding expected SNR of user i at UAV-enabled mmWave
BS a is
pLOSa,i P
t
aha,iρaGa,i[La(la−li)]−1
σ2a
, where σ2a is the noise power in UAV-enabled mmWave BS a’s
channel. As a result, the downlink transmission rate of user i at UAV-enabled mmWave BS a is
Ra,i =
Wa
Na
log2
(
1 +
Pa,i
σ2a
)
=
Wa
Na
log2
(
1 +
pLOSa,i P
t
aha,iρaGa,i [La (la − li)]−1
σ2a
)
,
(9)
where Wa is the bandwidth of mmWave channel at UAV-enabled mmWave BS a and Na is the
number of users selecting UAV-enabled mmWave BS a.
B. The Concept of the Power-law Memory
As introduced in [7], most of the economic process are memory-aware due to the fact the memory
plays an essential role not only in the psychology but also in modern physics. To study the memory-
aware economic processes, fractional calculus, which are the integrals and derivatives of non-integer
order, have been widely introduced as a promising approach to investigate the role of the memory in
the economic processes such as [37] and [38]. Specifically, the memory-aware economic processes
are derived as follows:
1) Basically, the most general formulation of the economic processes can be presented in a
symbolic expression as Y (t) = F t0 (X (τ)) + Y0, where X (τ) with τ ∈ [0, t] is the time-
dependent input, Y (t) is the time-dependent output, and Y0 is the initial state of the time-
dependent output of the processes. Therein, F t0 is an operator describing the relationship
between the time-dependent input X (τ) and output Y (t) and hence is a mapping that can
determine the time-dependent output Y (t) based on the time-dependent input X (τ) with
τ ∈ [0, t]. Initially, an integer-order integral based approach, i.e., Y (t) = ∫ t
0
X (τ) dt + Y0
with F t0 (X (τ)) :=
∫ t
0
X (τ) dt , has been widely adopted to study the dynamics in such
economic processes, e.g., [39] and [40].
4Note that due to the different propagation environments, the LOS models of the mmWave BS and the UAV-enabled mmWave
BS are different.
11
2) However, a vital drawback exists in the integer-order integral based approach. By taking
derivative of Y (t) =
t∫
0
X (τ) dt + Y0 with respect to t, the formulation of the economic
processes based on the integer-order integral can be represented in the expression of the
ordinary differential equation as d
dt
Y (t) = X (t) with Y (0) = Y0. In these processes, ddtY (t)
does not have any information about X (τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t) and hence depends only on X (t),
which means that the reaction of the economic processes based on the integer-order integral
is not aware of the changes of X (τ) for all τ ∈ [0, t) and further not memory-aware.
3) To address this drawback, the economists in [7] considered the Volterra operator, i.e., a
mapping, which can be specifically expressed as F t0 (X (τ)) :=
t∫
0
Mβ (t− τ)X (τ) dt, where
Mβ (t− τ) is a weighting function to measure the impact level of the previous input X (τ)
on the current output Y (t) according to the time distance between τ and t. Therein, the
value of the weighting function Mβ (t− τ) changes with respect to τ such that the dy-
namic characteristic of the memory can be captured. Additionally, by introducing such a
weighting function into the economic process, the first derivative of Y (t), i.e., d
dt
Y (t) =
Mβ (t)X (0) +
∫ t
0
Mβ (t− τ)
[
d
dτ
X (τ)
]
dτ , no longer depends only on X (t) but also on
X (τ) with τ ∈ [0, t). The specifical form of Mβ (t− τ) is considered to be in the power
form, i.e., Mβ (t− τ) = 1Γ(β) 1(t−τ)1−β , where
Γ (z) =
∫ +∞
0
xz−1e−xdx (10)
is the gamma function [41]. It is worth noting that the power-law characteristic of the
human’s memory has been extensively demonstrated in experiments [42], e.g., power-law
forgetting [43] and power-law human learning [44].
4) To represent the economic processes in the expression of fractional equation, we take the
derivation of Y (t) at the order of β by using the left-sided Caputo fractional derivative. As
a result, the memory-aware economic processes can be represented as follows:
C
0D
β
t Y (t) = X (t) , (11)
with the initial state for the economic processes, i.e., Y (0) = Y0, where C0D
β
t Y (t) is the
left-sided Caputo fractional derivative of Y (t) at the order of β defined as follows [9]
C
0D
β
t Y (t) =
1
Γ (dβe − β)
∫ t
0
Y (dβe) (τ)
(t− τ)β+1−dβe
dτ, (12)
and dβe denotes the integer obtained by rounding up β.
As illustrated in [9], by incorporating the power-law memory, the following key properties of
the impact of the user’s memory on their decision-making process will be satisfied:
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• The past experience of the user at different points in time play different roles in its decision-
making such that the dynamic characteristic of the memory can be captured.
• The user is affected by its experience within the memory rather than that at the present point
in time. For example, unlike the economic processes studied in [39] and [40] that the users are
only aware of their instantaneous achievable utilities, the memory-affecting users are allowed
to take into account their past experience within their memory.
• The memory-affecting users perform to react differently from the memory-unaware users do,
which can be verified in reality that the empirical stock trader prefers conservative style rather
than radical one. As such, the empirical trader reacts more cautiously than the newbie does.
Note that the fractional calculus has been widely adopted to depict the memory effect in multiple
disciplines such as economics, e.g., [10], [29], and human science, e.g., [45], [46]. Specifically, the
generalization of the economic model of natural growth with power-law memory suggested in [10]
applied the fractional differential equation to investigate the proportional relationship between the
income and the growth rate of the output. [45] presented a method to estimate the rate at which
the human brain learns a certain amount of knowledge is proportional to the amount of knowledge
yet to be learned by using the fractional differential equation.
IV. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we give two representative system models. For the purpose to justify the advantage
of incorporating the memory effect and avoid being affected by any other environmental factor,
we first consider a system model, i.e., HetNet with homogeneous users, in Section IV-A. Then,
a generalization of the simplified system model, which considers the scenario with heterogeneous
users, is presented in Section IV-B.
A. A Heterogeneous Network with Homogeneous Users
We first consider a HetNet, where three BSs, i.e., UHF BS u, mmWave BS m, and UAV-enabled
mmWave BS a, are deployed in the network. The homogeneous users are regarded as a group,
denoted by NG, to select the BSs and access the communication services. That is, NGu , NGm, and
NGa users will select UHF BS u, mmWave BS m, and UAV-enabled mmWave BS a, respectively,
where NGu + N
G
m + N
G
a = N
G is the total number of the users. Accordingly, each user in the
group selects UHF BS u, mmWave BS m, and UAV-enabled mmWave BS a at the probabilities
of yu =
NGu
NG
, ym =
NGm
NG
, and ya =
NGa
NG
, respectively. Here, in the system model of the HetNet
with homogeneous users, we assume that the users are homogeneous in the long-term basis. For
13
example, the users have the same antenna gain and are likely to be in the same locations, e.g.,
indoor users working in the office.
1) User’s Utility: Based on the expression of the downlink transmission rate of UHF BS u,
i.e., (2), the expected downlink transmission rate for the users selecting UHF BS u can be derived
as follows. As the expected number of the users selecting UHF BS u is yuNG and UHF BS u is
based on TDMA, each user will access the channel with full bandwidth Wu at the probability of
1
yuNG
for every time shot. Therefore, the user can obtain the expected bandwidth of Wu
yuNG
in every
time slot. Then, the expected downlink transmission rate of UHF BS u is
R˜u =
Wu
yuNG
log2
(
1 +
Pu
σ2u
)
. (13)
Let λu denote the intrinsic value of unit bitrate, i.e, the utility that each user can obtain from
downloading one unit data by selecting the communication service of UHF BS u, the utility
excluding the cost that each user can obtain from selecting UHF BS u is therefore λuR˜u. To access
the UHF BS u’s communication service, the user needs to pay the service fee, which is proportional
to the user’s download and further the transmission rate. We denote the price of downloading one
unit data through UHF BS u’s communication service by φu, the utility including the cost that each
user can obtain by selecting UHF BS u is given by
Πu = λuR˜u − φuR˜u = (λu − φu) R˜u = λφuR˜u, (14)
where λφu = λu − φu.
Similar to (13) and based on (6) and (9), the expected downlink transmission rates of mmWave
BS m and UAV-enabled mmWave BS a for each user are R˜m = WmymNG log2
(
1 + Pm
σ2m
)
and R˜a =
Wa
yaNG
log2
(
1 + Pa
σ2a
)
, respectively. Then, similar to (14), the utilities of each user obtained from
selecting mmWave BS m and UAV-enabled mmWave BS a are respectively
Πm = λmR˜m − φmR˜m = (λm − φm) R˜m = λφmR˜m (15)
and
Πa = λaR˜a − φaR˜a = (λa − φa) R˜a = λφaR˜a, (16)
where λm and λa are respectively the intrinsic values of unit bitrate for mmWave BS m and UAV-
enabled mmWave BS a, φm and φa are respectively the price of downloading one unit data through
the mmWave BS m’s and UAV-enabled mmWave a’s communication service, λφm = λm − φm, and
λφa = λa − φa.
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2) Game Formulation for the Heterogeneous Cellular Network with Homogeneous Users: With
the utility functions defined in (14), (15), and (16), i.e., Πu, Πm, and Πa, respectively, the average
utility of the user is Π¯ = yuΠu + ymΠm + yaΠa, where yu, ym, and ya respectively represent the
probabilities that the users select UHF BS u, mmWave BS m, and UAV-enabled mmWave BS a.
Then, the replicator dynamics yields the following classical evolutionary game, i.e., the system of
Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs):
d
dt
yu (t) = exp (−δ) yu (t)
[
Πu (t)− Π¯ (t)
]
,
d
dt
ym (t) = exp (−δ) ym (t)
[
Πm (t)− Π¯ (t)
]
,
d
dt
ya (t) = exp (−δ) ya (t)
[
Πa (t)− Π¯ (t)
]
,
(17)
with the initial strategies, i.e., the Dirichlet boundary condition, of yu (0) = y0u, ym (0) = y
0
m, and
ya (0) = y
0
a, where
d
dt
represents the first derivative with respect to t and δ controls the gain from
the rate of strategy adaptation. Moreover, by incorporating the power-law memory, we formulate
the fractional evolutionary game based on the left-sided Caputo fractional derivative as follows:
C
0 D
β
t yu (t) = exp (−δ) yu (t)
[
Πu (t)− Π¯ (t)
]
,
C
0 D
β
t ym (t) = exp (−δ) ym (t)
[
Πm (t)− Π¯ (t)
]
C
0 D
β
t ya (t) = exp (−δ) ya (t)
[
Πa (t)− Π¯ (t)
]
,
, (18)
with the initial strategies of yu (0) = y0u, ym (0) = y
0
m, and ya (0) = y
0
a, where β ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1, 2)
is the order of the Caputo fractional derivative defined in (12). Note here that the specific physical
meaning of β is explained in Section VI-A. Since our fractional evolutionary game is a standard
system of fractional differential equations with the Dirichlet boundary condition, the solution of
which can be obtained numerically by using the standard algorithm in [47].
B. A Heterogeneous Cellular Network with Heterogeneous Users
In the network, there are three types of BSs deployed in the HetNet, i.e., UHF BSs, mmWave
BSs, and UAV-enabled mmWave BSs, each of which contains a set of BSs, i.e., U , M, and A
respectively denote the sets of UHF BSs, mmWave BSs, and UAV-enabled mmWave BSs. A set
of users, denoted by N , can select the BSs for their services, e.g., wireless multimedia. Each user
i ∈ N will select one of the BSs and access the communication service. That is, user i select UHF
BS u, mmWave BS m, and UAV-enabled mmWave BS a at the probabilities of xu,i, xm,i, and xa,i,
respectively. Note here that as a generalization of the scenario of the HetNet with homogeneous
users, we extend the number of BSs in each type and consider the users to be independent, the
parameters of which are different to each other, i.e., nonidentical.
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1) Users’ Utilities: Based on the equation of the downlink transmission rate for user i at UHF
BS u, i.e., (2), the users selecting UHF BS u will share the bandwidth of UHF BS u. The expected
number of the users selecting UHF BS u is
∑
j∈Nu
xu,j , and hence each user i ∈ Nu will access the
channel of full bandwidth Wu at the probability of 1∑
j∈Nu
xu,j
for every time slot, where Nu is the
set of the users in the coverage of UHF BS u, and Nv, Nv′ , Nm, and Na are defined similarly to
the way that Nu is defined. Therefore, the user can obtain the expected bandwidth of Wu∑
j∈Nu
xu,j
for
every time slot. By selecting UHF BS u at the probability of xu,i, the expected channel access of
user i at UHF BS u is therefore Wu
xu,i∑
j∈Nu
xu,j
. As for the SINR of user i at UHF BS u, we present
a simple example, where three UHF BSs, i.e., u, v, and v′, are deployed in the network, and the
scenario of more than three UHF BSs can be further investigated in a similar way. In the simple
example, UHF BSs u, v, and v′ are using the same channel, i.e., Iu = {v, v′}, and hence will
incur co-channel interference to each other. The SINR of user i at UHF BS u depends on the BS
selection strategies of the users in the coverage of UHF BSs v and v′. Accordingly, there are four
cases:
1) none of the users j ∈ Nv selects UHF BS v, and none of the users j′ ∈ Nv′ selects UHF BS
v′;
2) none of the users j ∈ Nv selects UHF BS v while there is at least one user j′ ∈ Nv′ selecting
UHF BS v′;
3) there is at least one user j ∈ Nv selecting UHF BS v while none of the users j′ ∈ Nv′ selects
UHF BS v′;
4) there is at least one user j ∈ Nv selecting UHF BS v, and there is at least one users j′ ∈ Nv′
selecting UHF BS v′.
For the first case, there is no co-channel interference from UHF BSs v and v′ to UHF BS
u, the SINR of user i at UHF BS u is therefore Pu,i
σ2u
with
∏
j∈Nv
(1− xv,j)
∏
j′∈Nv′
(1− xv′,j′) as
the case happening probability5. Similarly, the SINRs of user i at UHF BS u in the second,
third, and fourth cases are Pu,i
Pv′,i+σ2u
, Pu,i
Pv,i+σ2u
, and Pu,i∑
w∈Iu
Pw,i+σ2u
, respectively. Moreover, the happening
probabilities for the second, third, and fourth cases are
∏
j∈Nv
(1− xv,j)
[
1− ∏
j′∈Nv′
(1− xv′,j′)
]
,[
1− ∏
j∈Nv
(1− xv,j)
] ∏
j′∈Nv′
(1− xv′,j′), and
[
1− ∏
j∈Nv
(1− xv,j)
][
1− ∏
j′∈Nv′
(1− xv′,j′)
]
, respec-
tively. Based on (2), the expected downlink transmission rate of user i at UHF BS u is therefore
5As we assume in Section III-A1 that the UHF BSs use TDMA, user i ∈ Nu will suffer from the co-channel interference caused
by the communication service of UHF BS w ∈ Iu only when there is at least one user j ∈ Nw selecting UHF BS w.
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R¯u,i =Wu
xu,i∑
j∈Nu
xu,j
log2
(
1 +
Pu,i
σ2u
) ∏
j∈Nv
(1− xv,j)
∏
j′∈Nv′
(1− xv′,j′)
+ log2
(
1 +
Pu,i
Pv′,i + σ2u
) ∏
j∈Nv
(1− xv,j)
1− ∏
j′∈Nv′
(1− xv′,j′)

+ log2
(
1 +
Pu,i
Pv,i + σ2u
)[
1−
∏
j∈Nv
(1− xv,j)
] ∏
j′∈Nv′
(1− xv′,j′)
+ log2
1 + Pu,i∑
w∈Iu
Pw,i + σ2u
[1− ∏
j∈Nv
(1− xv,j)
]1− ∏
j′∈Nv′
(1− xv′,j′)
 .
(19)
defined in (19).
Let φu,i denote the price of downloading one unit data through UHF BS u’s communication
service for user i. Then, the utility of user i obtained from ing UHF BS u is a function of the
transmission rate given by
Uu,i = λu,iR¯u,i − φu,iR¯u,i = (λu,i − φu,i) R¯u,i = λφu,iR¯u,i, (20)
where λu,i denotes the intrinsic value of unit bitrate for user i and λ
φ
u,i = λu,i − φu,i.
Similar to (19) and based on (6) and (9), the expected downlink transmission rates of user i
at mmWave BS m and UAV-enabled mmWave BS a are R¯m,i = Wm
xm,i∑
j∈Nm
xm,j
log2
(
1 +
Pm,i
σ2m
)
and
R¯a,i = Wa
xa,i∑
j∈Na
xa,j
log2
(
1 +
Pa,i
σ2a
)
, respectively. Accordingly, the utilities of user i obtained from
selecting mmWave BS m and UAV-enabled mmWave BS a are respectively
Um,i =λm,iR¯m,i − φm,iR¯m,i
= (λm,i − φm,i) R¯m,i = λφm,iR¯m,i
(21)
and
Ua,i = λa,iR¯a,i − φa,iR¯a,i = (λa,i − φa,i) R¯a,i = λφa,iR¯a,i, (22)
where λm,i and λa,i are respectively the intrinsic values of unit bitrate of mmWave BS m and
UAV-enabled mmWave BS a for user i, φm,i and φa,i are respectively the prices of downloading
one unit data through mmWave BS m’s and UAV-enabled mmWave a’s communication services
for user i, λφm,i = λm,i − φm,i, and λφa,i = λa,i − φa,i.
2) Game Formulation for the Heterogeneous Cellular Network with Heterogeneous Users: With
the utilities of user i obtained from UHF BS u, mmWave BS m, and UAV-enabled mmWave BS a,
i.e., (20), (21), and (22), respectively, the average utility of user i from all the BSs is expressed by
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U¯i =
∑
u∈CUi
xu,iUu,i +
∑
m∈CMi
xm,iUm,i +
∑
a∈CAi
xa,iUa,i, where CUi , CMi , and CAi are the sets of UHF BSs,
mmWave BSs, and UAV-enabled mmWave BSs covering user i, respectively. Then, the replicator
dynamics yields the following classical evolutionary game:
d
dt
xu,i (t) = exp (−δ)xu,i (t)
[
Uu,i (t)− U¯i (t)
]
d
dt
xm,i (t) = exp (−δ)xm,i (t)
[
Um,i (t)− U¯i (t)
]
d
dt
xa,i (t) = exp (−δ)xa,i (t)
[
Ua,i (t)− U¯i (t)
] (23)
with the initial strategies of xu,i (0) = x0u,i, xm,i (0) = x
0
m,i, and xa,i (0) = x
0
a,i. By incorporating the
power-law memory, we further formulate the fractional evolutionary game based on the left-sided
Caputo fractional derivative as follows:
C
0 D
β
t xu,i (t) = exp (−δ)xu,i (t)
[
Uu,i (t)− U¯i (t)
]
C
0 D
β
t xm,i (t) = exp (−δ)xm,i (t)
[
Um,i (t)− U¯i (t)
]
C
0 D
β
t xa,i (t) = exp (−δ)xa,i (t)
[
Ua,i (t)− U¯i (t)
] (24)
with the initial strategies of xu,i (0) = x0u,i, xm,i (0) = x
0
m,i, and xa,i (0) = x
0
a,i, where β ∈ (0, 1) ∪
(1, 2) is the order of the left-sided Caputo fractional derivative defined in (12).
V. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium of the fractional evolutionary game defined in (24),
where the existence, uniqueness, and stability of the equilibrium are theoretically verified. We first
transform the fractional evolutionary game defined in (24) into an equivalent problem in Theorem 1.
Then, we analytically prove that the equivalent problem admits a unique solution in Theorem 2,
which implies the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the fractional evolutionary game
defined in (24). Furthermore, we prove the equilibrium of the fractional evolutionary game defined
in (24) to be uniformly stable in Theorem 3.
A. Existence and Uniqueness on the Fractional Evolutionary Equilibrium
Considering the fractional evolutionary game defined in (24), let X (t) = [xw,i (t)]w∈U∪M∪A,i∈N
and F (X (t)) =
[
exp (−δ)xw,i (t)
[
Uw,i (t)− U¯i (t)
]]
w∈U∪M∪A,i∈N , we accordingly have the frac-
tional evolutionary game (24) in a simplified form as follows:
C
0 D
β
tX (t) = F (X (t)) , (25)
where X (0) = X0 =
[
x0w,i
]
w∈U∪M∪A,i∈N and t ∈ T = [0, T ].
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THEOREM 1. If fj , i.e., the j-th element of the vector F, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N (U + A+M)}, satisfies
the following conditions:
• fj : D 7→ R+ is second-order continuous,
• ∂
∂xw,i
fj exists and is bounded on D, ∀w ∈ U ∪M∪A, ∀i ∈ N ,
(25) has an equivalent problem as follows:
X (t) = X0 + 0I
β
t F (X (t)) , ∀t ∈ T = [0, T ] , (26)
where 0I
β
t is the fractional integral defined as follows [48]:
0I
β
t f (t) =
∫ t
0
(t− τ)β−1
Γ (β)
f (τ) dτ, (27)
the second condition implies the Lipschitz condition, i.e., for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N (U + A+M)},
|fj (X (t))− fj (Y (t))| < L ‖X (t)−Y (t)‖L1 , where L ∈ R+, and N , U , A, and M are the
cardinalities of N , U , A, and M, respectively.
Proof. From (26), we have
ddβe
dtdβe
X (t) =
ddβe
dtdβe
[
0I
β
t F (X (t))
]
= RL0 D
dβe−β
t F (X (t)) , (28)
where RL0 D
α
t z (t) is the Riemann-Liouville fractional derivative with respect to t defined as fol-
lows [49]:
RL
0 D
α
t z (t) =
ddαe
dtdαe
[
0I
dαe−α
t z (t)
]
=
ddαe
dtdαe
[
1
Γ (dαe − α)
∫ t
0
z (τ)
(t− τ)1−dαe+α
dτ
]
.
(29)
In (28), according to the definition of the Riemann-Liouville fractional derivative in (29), we have
RL
0 D
dβe−β
t F (X (t))
=
d
dt
[
1
Γ (1− dβe+ β)
∫ t
0
F (X (τ))
(t− τ)dβe−β
dτ
]
=
1
Γ (1− dβe+ β)
d
dt
∫ t
0
(t− τ)β−dβeF (X (τ))dτ
=
1
Γ (1− dβe+ β)
d
dt
∫ t
0
θβ−dβeF (X (t− θ))dθ
=
1
Γ (1− dβe+ β)
[
tβ−dβeF
(
X0
)
+
∫ t
0
θβ−dβe
d
dt
F (X (t− θ))dθ
]
=
1
Γ (1− dβe+ β)
[
tβ−dβeF
(
X0
)
+
∫ t
0
(t− τ)β−dβe d
dτ
F (X (τ))dτ
]
=
tβ−dβe
Γ (1− dβe+ β)F
(
X0
)
+ C0 D
dβe−β
t F (X (t)) ,
(30)
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where the variable limit integral derivation method is applied. Substituting the results that we obtain
in (30) into (28), we can have
ddβe
dtdβe
X (t) = Ξ
(
β,X0
)
+ 0I
β
t
[
ddβe
dtdβe
F (X (t))
]
, (31)
where
Ξ
(
β,X0
)
=
tβ−dβe
Γ (1− dβe+ β)F
(
X0
)
(32)
represents the first term of the result in (30). Moreover, let σ ∈ (0, t), there exists an upper bound
of Ξ (β,X0) in the L1 norm, which can be expressed as follows:∥∥Ξ (β,X0)∥∥L1 < ∥∥Ξσ (β,X0)∥∥L1
=
∥∥∥∥ σβ−dβeΓ (1− dβe+ β)F (X0)
∥∥∥∥
L1
(33)
Then, based on (31) and (33) as well as the second condition in Theorem 1, we have the following
inequality expression: ∥∥∥∥ ddβedtdβeX (t)
∥∥∥∥
T
<
∥∥Ξσ (β,X0)∥∥L1 + ∥∥∥∥0Iβt ddβedtdβeF (X (t))
∥∥∥∥
T
<
∥∥Ξσ (β,X0)∥∥L1 + ∥∥∥∥0Iβt ddβedtdβeX (t)
∥∥∥∥
T
N (U + A+M)L,
(34)
where ‖z‖T =
∫
T e
−µt ‖z (t)‖L1 dt.
Regarding the norm in the second term of the right-hand side of the inequality equation (34),
i.e.,
∥∥∥0Iβt ddβedtdβeX (t)∥∥∥T , we have∥∥∥∥0Iβt ddβedtdβeX (t)
∥∥∥∥
T
=
∫ T
0
e−µt
∥∥∥∥0Iβt ddβedtdβeX (t)
∥∥∥∥ dt
≤
∫ T
0
e−µt
∫ t
0
1
Γ (β)
∥∥∥ ddβedsdβeX (s)∥∥∥
(t− s)1−β ds dt
=
∫ T
0
e−µs
Γ (β)
∥∥∥∥ ddβedsdβeX (s)
∥∥∥∥∫ T
s
e−µ(t−s) (t− s)β−1 dt ds
=
∫ T
0
e−µs
Γ (β)
∥∥∥∥ ddβedsdβeX (s)
∥∥∥∥∫ T−s
0
e−µθθβ−1dθ ds
=
∫ T
0
e−µs
Γ (β)
∥∥∥∥ ddβedsdβeX (s)
∥∥∥∥∫ µ(T−s)
0
e−ψ
(
ψ
µ
)β−1
d
(
ψ
µ
)
ds
<
1
µβΓ (β)
∫ T
0
e−µs
∥∥∥∥ ddβedsdβeX (s)
∥∥∥∥ ds ∫ +∞
0
e−ψψβ−1dψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
gamma function defined in (10)
=
1
µβ
∥∥∥∥ ddβedtdβeX (t)
∥∥∥∥
T
.
(35)
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Table II: Parameters for the Network Model
Symbol Typical Value Symbol Typical Value
Wm, Wu Wa 1 GHz, 20 MHz, 1 GHz fm, fu 70 GHz, 1.8 GHz (e.g., 4G/LTE)
Pu, Pm, Pa 46 dBm [32], 30 dBm [32], 23 dBm [50] Gu, Gm,i, Ga,i 0 dBi, (GM , GS), GA
σ2u −174dBm/Hz + 10 log10 (Wu) + 10dB [32] GM , GS , GA 18 dBi, −2 dBi, 18 dBi [32]
σ2m −174dBm/Hz + 10 log10 (Wm) + 10dB [32] C, D 0.081, 250 m [33]
σ2a −174dBm/Hz + 10 log10 (Wa) + 10dB [32] Ha 20m [50]
αLOSm , αNLOSm , αu 2, 4 [51], 2.7 θSa 45◦
hu,i, hm,i, ha,i exp (1) b, c 1.5, 1
Then, we substitute the results obtained from (35) into (34) and have∥∥∥∥ ddβedtdβeX (t)
∥∥∥∥
T
<
∥∥Ξσ (β,X0)∥∥L1 + 1µβ
∥∥∥∥ ddβedtdβeX (t)
∥∥∥∥
T
N (U + A+M)L,
⇔
∥∥∥∥ ddβedtdβeX (t)
∥∥∥∥
T
<
1
1− N(U+A+M)L
µβ
∥∥Ξσ (β,X0)∥∥L1 ,
(36)
which means that
∥∥∥ ddβedtdβeX (t)∥∥∥T is bounded when we choose µ such that N (U + A+M)L < µβ .
We take the fractional derivative of (26) at the order of β as follows:
C
0 D
β
tX (t) = 0I
dβe−β
t
ddβe
dtdβe
X (t)
(31)
= 0I
dβe−β
t
{
Ξ
(
β,X0
)
+ 0I
β
t
[
ddβe
dtdβe
F (X (t))
]}
= F (X (t)) ,
(37)
which means that (25) has the equivalent problem defined in (26), and this completes the proof.
Then, we prove that the equivalent problem defined in (26) admits a unique solution, which
implies that (25) also admits a unique solution.
THEOREM 2. With the conditions presented in Theorem 1, the problem defined in (26) admits a
unique solution.
Proof. Given an operator Λ : DX 7→ DX, we have the inequality expression in (38). From (38), we
can conclude that ‖ΛX− ΛY‖T < ‖X−Y‖T if we choose µ such that µβ > N (U +M + A)L.
Hence, the operator Λ has a unique fixed point, which indicates that the equivalent problem defined
in (26) has a unique solution, and consequently the equilibrium of the fractional evolutionary game
defined in (25) exists and is unique. The proof is completed.
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‖ΛX (t)− ΛY (t)‖T
=
∫ T
0
e−µt
∥∥∥0Iβt F (X (t))− 0Iβt F (Y (t))∥∥∥dt < N (U +M +A)L
[∫ T
0
e−µt
∥∥∥0IβtX (t)− 0IβtY (t)∥∥∥dt
]
≤N (U +M +A)L
[∫ T
0
e−µt
∫ t
0
1
Γ (β)
‖X (s)−Y (s)‖
(t− s)1−β
ds dt
]
=
N (U +M +A)L
Γ (β)
[∫ T
0
∫ T
s
e−µt
‖X (s)−Y (s)‖
(t− s)1−β
dt ds
]
=
N (U +M +A)L
Γ (β)
[∫ T
0
e−µs ‖X (s)−Y (s)‖
∫ T
s
e−µ(t−s)
(t− s)1−β
dt ds
]
=
N (U +M +A)L
Γ (β)
[∫ T
0
e−µs ‖X (s)−Y (s)‖
∫ T−s
0
e−µθθβ−1dθ ds
]
=
N (U +M +A)L
Γ (β)
[∫ T
0
e−µs ‖X (s)−Y (s)‖
∫ µ(T−s)
0
e−ψ
(
ψ
µ
)β−1
d
(
ψ
µ
)
ds
]
=
N (U +M +A)L
µβΓ (β)
[∫ T
0
e−µs ‖X (s)−Y (s)‖
∫ µ(T−s)
0
e−ψψβ−1dψ ds
]
<
N (U +M +A)L
µβΓ (β)
‖X (t)−Y (t)‖T
∫ +∞
0
e−σσβ−1dσ︸ ︷︷ ︸
gamma function defined in (10)
=
N (U +M +A)L
µβ
‖X (t)−Y (t)‖T .
(38)
B. Stability on the Fractional Evolutionary Equilibrium
After we verify the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the fractional evolutionary
game defined in (25), we investigate its stability, i.e., robustness, in Theorem 3 through studying
the variations incurred by the small perturbations of the boundary condition.
THEOREM 3. With conditions presented in Theorem 1, the equilibrium of the fractional evolutionary
game defined in (25) is uniformly stable.
Proof. Let X˜ (t) and Xˆ (t) be the solutions of C0 D
β
tX (t) = F (X (t)) with the initial strategies
of X˜ (0) = X˜0 =
[
x˜0w,i
]
w∈U∪M∪A,i∈N and Xˆ (0) = Xˆ
0 =
[
xˆ0w,i
]
w∈U∪M∪A,i∈N , respectively. Then,
similar to Theorems 1 and 2, we can have the following inequality expression∥∥∥X˜ (t)− Xˆ (t)∥∥∥
T
<
∥∥∥X˜0 − Xˆ0∥∥∥
L1
+
N (U +M + A)L
µβ
∥∥∥X˜ (t)− Xˆ (t)∥∥∥
T
⇔
∥∥∥X˜ (t)− Xˆ (t)∥∥∥
T
<
1
1− N(U+M+A)L
µβ
∥∥∥X˜0 − Xˆ0∥∥∥
L1
.
(39)
From (39), we can have
∥∥∥X˜ (t)− Xˆ (t)∥∥∥
T
<
∥∥∥X˜0 − Xˆ0∥∥∥
L1
when we choose µ such that µβ <
N (U +M + A)L, which indicates the uniform stability of the equilibrium of the fractional evo-
lutionary game defined in (25) [52]. The proof is completed.
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Table III: Parameters setting for the heterogeneous network with homogeneous users
BSs and user Coordinate (Km) Parameters Value
UHF BS [1 0 0] λφu 10−7
mmWave BS [0 0 0] λφm 1.5× 10−9
UAV-enabled
mmWave BS
[0 0.1 0.02] λφa 10
−9
User group [0 0.1 0] NG, δ 10, 2
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Figure 2: (a) The user’s network selection strategy and (b) frequency of strategy adaptation in the
classical evolutionary game and fractional evolutionary game
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct extensive numerical simulations to investigate the behaviors of the
users in the classical evolutionary game and that in the fractional evolutionary game. The parameter
setting for the network model of the HetNet is shown in Table II, which is similar to those in [32]
and [50]. The domains of definition for yu (t), ym (t), ya (t), xu,i (t), xm,i (t), xa,i (t) are [0, 1] for
all t ∈ [0, T ]. We first evaluate the performance of the HetNet with homogeneous users formulated
in Section IV-A and investigate the stability of the equilibriums for the classical evolutionary game
and fractional evolutionary game. Then, we investigate the behaviors of the heterogeneous users in
the HetNet with small-scale fading under different game formulations, i.e., the classical evolutionary
game and fractional evolutionary game.
A. Numerical Results for the System Model of the Heterogeneous Network with Homogeneous Users
We first evaluate the system model formulated in Section IV-A with the parameter setting given
in Table III. We compare the results obtained from the fractional evolutionary games with β = 0.7
and β = 1.3 with that obtained from the classical evolutionary game, i.e., β = 1, in Fig. 2. As
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Figure 3: The impact of the coefficient β of the left-sided Caputo fractional derivative on the
fractional evolutionary game
shown in Fig. 2(a), the user’s strategy of the fractional evolutionary game with β = 1.3 initially
fluctuates in a range more widely than that of the classical evolutionary game and the fractional
evolutionary game with β = 0.7. This means that the strategy adaptation rate of the users in the
fractional evolutionary game with β = 1.3 is faster than that in both the classical evolutionary game
and the fractional evolutionary game with β = 0.7. This is consistent with the result in Fig. 2(b)
that the frequency of strategy adaptation of the fractional evolutionary game with β = 1.3 at around
t = 4 is higher than that in both the classical evolutionary game and the fractional evolutionary
game with β = 0.7. However, it can be observed in Fig. 2(b) that the user’s strategies in the
fractional evolutionary game with β = 1.3 converge to the equilibrium more slowly than that in
both the classical evolutionary game and the fractional evolutionary game with β = 0.7. This is
due to the fluctuation in the user’s strategy of the fractional evolutionary game with β = 1.3.
To specifically illustrate the impact of the coefficient β of the left-sided Caputo fractional
derivative on the fractional evolutionary game and further explain its physical meaning, we vary
the value of β and show the numerical results in Fig. 3. In the figure, the user’s strategy fluctuate
more widely as the value of β increases in the fractional evolutionary games with both β < 1 and
β > 1. This means that the strategy adaptation rate increases as the value of β increases. Moreover,
from Fig. 3(b), as the value of β increases, the rate that the user’s strategy converges to the vicinity
of the equilibrium strategy becomes faster. This is also due to the strategy adaptation rate, which
is consistent with the results in and the explanation for Fig. 2.
To specifically illustrate the impact of the coefficient β of the left-sided Caputo fractional
derivative on the fractional evolutionary game and further explain its physical meaning, we vary the
value of β and show the results in Fig. 3. In the figure, the rate that the user’s strategy converges to
the equilibrium becomes faster as the value of β increases in the fractional evolutionary game with
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both β < 1 and β > 1. This means that the convergence rate of the replicator dynamics increases
as the value of β increases. Moreover, from Fig. 3(b), the rate that the user’s strategy converges
to the vicinity of the equilibrium strategy becomes faster as the value of β increases. This implies
that the user’s strategy adaptation rate increases as the value of β increases, which is consistent
with the results in and the explanation for Fig. 2.
In addition, we also evaluate the user’s utility under different memory effects, i.e., different values
of β. As shown in Fig. 3(c), the memory effect with β = 0.7 ∈ (0, 1) can lead to a worse utility
for the user compared with the model without memory effect, i.e., β = 1. In contrast, the memory
effect with β = 1.3 ∈ (1, 2) can lead to a better utility for the user compared with the model
without memory effect. The results observed in Fig. 3(c) are consistent with the results in [10]. In
this case, we would like to define the memory effect with β ∈ (0, 1) as negative memory effect
and that with β ∈ (1, 2) as positive memory effect.
To verify the stability of the strategies in the classical and fractional evolutionary games, we
present the direction field of the replicator dynamics. Moreover, to better understand the stability
of equilibriums in the classical and fractional evolutionary games, we show the direction field of
the replicator dynamics at t = 120, where the user’s strategies have already been stabilized at the
equilibrium strategies as shown in Fig. 2. As shown in Fig. 4, any unstable strategy will follow
the arrow to reach the equilibrium strategy, which is marked by the black circle. This demonstrates
the convergence and stability of the strategy and is consistent with Theorem 3. Additionally, the
strategies converge to different equilibrium strategies at t = 120 in the classical and fractional
evolutionary games as shown in Fig. 2. This can also be verified by using the direction field of
the replicator dynamics in Fig. 4, e.g., the unstable strategies follow the arrow to reach different
equilibrium strategies in different games as shown in Figs. 4(a), (b), and (c).
Next, we evaluate the joint impact of the memory and the small-scale fading on the user’s
cumulative utility. We assume the channel gain of the user will fluctuate every time interval of
0.01. Note here that the results of the user’s cumulative utility with the small-fading are the mean
of the results we obtained from repeating the fractional/classical evolutionary game for 100 times.
As shown in Fig. 5(a), the user’s cumulative utilities in all the games get damaged due to the
randomicity in the user’s channel gain caused by the small-scale fading. To explicitly explore the
damage in the user’s cumulative utility, we summarize the results of Fig. 5(a) in Figs. 5(b), (c),
and (d). Here, the results show that the positive memory effect, i.e., β ∈ (1, 2), can help the user
to reduce the negative effect caused by the small-scale fading on its cumulative utility compared
with the negative memory effect, i.e., β ∈ (0, 1). The reason is that the fast strategy adaptation rate
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Figure 4: Direction field of the replicator dynamics for verifying the stability of the strategies in
the (fractional) evolutionary equilibrium when t = 120
of the users due to the positive memory effect can help the user to timely make decision on its
network selection strategy, which in return reduces the negative effect caused by the small-scale
fading on its cumulative utility.
B. Numerical Results for the System Model of the Heterogeneous Network with Heterogeneous
Users
We consider the HetNet with 2 UHF BSs, 2 mmWave BSs, and 4 UAV-enabled mmWave BSs
for simplicity, the locations of which are indicated in Table IV. The locations of the users are given
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Figure 5: (a) The user’s cumulative utility and the loss in the user’s cumulative utility in the
fractional/classical evolutionary games with β = 1 (b), β = 0.7 (c), and β = 1.3 (d) due to the
small-scale fading
Table IV: Location of the BSs and users
Set No. Coordinate (Km) Set No. Coordinate (Km)
UHF BS U
1 [1 0 0]
UAV-enabled
mmWave BS A
1 [0 0.1 0.02]
2 [1 7 0] 2 [0 − 0.1 0.02]
mmWave BS M
1 [0 0 0] 3 [0 7.1 0.02]
2 [0 7 0] 4 [0 6.9 0.02]
User N
1 [0 0.12 0]
User N
9 [0 7.12 0]
2 [0 0.08 0] 10 [0 7.08 0]
3 [0.02 0.1 0] 11 [0.02 7.1 0]
4 [−0.02 0.1 0] 12 [−0.02 7.1 0]
5 [0 − 0.12 0] 13 [0 6.92 0]
6 [0 − 0.08 0] 14 [0 6.88 0]
7 [0.02 − 0.1 0] 15 [0.02 6.9 0]
8 [−0.02 − 0.1 0] 16 [−0.02 6.9 0]
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Table V: Parameters setting for the heterogeneous network with heterogeneous users
Parameters Value Parameters Value
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Figure 6: The users’ network selection strategies with small-scale fading
in Table IV. The parameter setting for the system model is shown in Table V. We evaluate the
performance of the HetNet with the small-scale fading.
From Fig. 6, we observe that the convergence rate of the replicator dynamics in the fractional
evolutionary game with β = 1.3 is still the fastest compared with that in the other two games, i.e.,
classical evolutionary game and fractional evolutionary game with β = 0.7, under the condition of
the small-scale fading. Moreover, the users in the fractional evolutionary game with β = 1.3 are not
significantly affected by the small-scale fading. For example, as shown in Fig. 6(c), the user 11’s
UAV-enabled mmWave BS 3 selection strategy fluctuates in both the classical evolutionary game
and fractional evolutionary game with β = 0.7 while that in the fractional evolutionary game with
β = 1.3 stably evolves and converges to the equilibrium strategy. The reason is that in the fractional
evolutionary game with β > 1, the positive memory effect can incentivize the users to accelerate
their reaction speed and further the evolution processes. In this case, the users in the fractional
evolutionary game with positive memory effect will experience only a short-term network switch
and moreover the negative effect caused by the small-scale fading has little impact on the strategy
evolution of the users compared with the users in the other two games.
In summary, we have evaluated the performance of the HetNet and the users’ utilities under
different memory effects. In the HetNet with homogeneous users, the fractional evolutionary game
with negative memory effect induces a low utility for the users and slow strategy adaptation for the
replicator dynamics compared with the fractional evolutionary game with positive memory effect.
Moreover, in the HetNet with homogeneous users, the positive memory effect can help the user to
reduce the negative effect caused by the small-scale fading on its cumulative utility. Furthermore,
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in the HetNet with heterogeneous users, the evolution processes of the users in the fractional
evolutionary game with positive memory effect are not significantly affected by the small-scale
fading compared with that with negative memory effect.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented dynamic game framework to analyze the strategies of the users in the HetNets.
The interaction among the users has been first modeled as an evolutionary game, where the dynamic
network selection strategies of the users are captured by the replicator dynamics. Then, we cast
the classical evolutionary game as a fractional evolutionary game by incorporating the concept
of the power-law memory, where the decision-making of the users is affected by their memory.
We analytically validated the existence, uniqueness, and stability of the fractional evolutionary
equilibrium. We also numerically verified the stability of the fractional evolutionary equilibrium.
The stable and unique fractional evolutionary equilibrium has been obtained as the solution to the
fractional evolutionary game. Moreover, we have presented a series of insightful analytical and
numerical results on the equilibrium of the fractional evolutionary games. For future work, we will
further include the UAV-enabled mmWave BSs as players.
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